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Abstract
By
Robin Emir Gonzales

The Spratly islands dispute is a regional maritime territorial sovereignty dispute which
involves six countries in the South China Sea – China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia
and Brunei. Underscored by the prospects of large natural energy reserves, control of strategic
global maritime areas, and shifting global power dynamics, the dispute has significant
international geo-strategic, economic, political and legal implications. This Honors Thesis
evaluates the international legal standards for resolving maritime sovereignty disputes, provides
a historiography of the six countries’ competing claims, and analyzes the legal soundness of their
claims. This thesis also proposes and examines potential political and diplomatic frameworks as
alternative routes for resolving the Spratly islands dispute.
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International Law and Maritime Territorial Sovereignty Disputes

Evolution of International Law and Law of the Sea
Western scholars divide the legal universe into two parts – international law and
domestic law. While domestic law prescribes rules governing everything within a state, such as
conduct or status of individuals, corporations, domestic government units, and other entities,
international law prescribes rules that govern the relations of nation-states or simply “states.”1
International law is further divided into international public law and international private law.
For the purposes of this thesis, only international public law will be discussed. In The Law of
Nations, J.L. Brierly defined international public law as “the body of rules and principles of
action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with another.”2
Though great empires have existed in China, India and Japan, as well as throughout
Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and in the course of having relations with other
peoples, have developed systems of international law, the contemporary international system of
law is a product of Western European political developments over the last four centuries.3 The
concept of states as primary actors in international relations and the concept of state sovereignty,
which are all fundamental doctrines in the modern international system, originated from
practices and customs of European states and their interactions and communication with each
other.4 Though echoing critiques of whether these western notions should be the standard for

1

Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, 5th ed. (Gaithersburg [Md.: Aspen Law
& Business, 2007), 1.
2
J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1963), 1.
3
Carter and Trimble, International Law, 846.
4
Ibid.
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international law, particularly in resolving disputes between non-western countries, non-western
countries have themselves accepted and supported the general notions of this European system.5
As it has come to be generally accepted, and as well as incorporated in Article 38 of the
International Court of Justice Statutes, the primary sources of international law are “international
conventions, international custom and the general principles of law as recognized by civilized
nations” and subsidiary sources are “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists of various nations.”6 As this thesis’ focus is on international law regulating the seas, a
brief discussion of the evolution and sources of international law of the seas is appropriate.
Until the twentieth century, the customary law of the sea was premised on the freedom of
the seas doctrine. Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum, published in 1609, argued that “no nation could
legitimately exercise sovereignty over any of the world’s oceans.”7 In the centuries that
followed, the concept of freedom of the seas, though universally adhered to, brought about
debates, among other things, on the extent to which coastal states could control the waters
immediately adjacent to its coast.8
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was growing movement to codify
international law. The navies of maritime powers competed to maintain a presence across the
globe as there was a movement to extend national claims over offshore resources. The freedom
of the seas doctrine was threatening to turn the oceans into another area of conflict and

5

R. Haller-Trost, Clive H. Schofield, and Peter R. Hocknell, The Territorial Dispute between
Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan in the Celebes Sea: A Study in
International Law, vol. 2, series 2 (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of
Durham, 1995), 1.
6
International Court of Justice, Statute of the Court, Article 38, accessed February 10, 2014,
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0&.
7
Carter and Trimble, International Law, 848.
8
Ibid.
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instability9. In the 1920s, the League of Nations recognized the need to codify the law of the
sea.10 In 1930, a conference at The Hague was called for this purpose.11 Though the Hague
Convention did not result in any binding agreement, by the time it was called, the main doctrinal
features of the law of the sea that are recognizable today had already formed as the products of
intellectual trends.12 Included in this trend were:
the European centrism of the law of the sea, the conceptual division between
ownership of ocean areas, and jurisdiction over maritime activities, the notional
supremacy of freedom of the seas, the dynamic competition between coastal State
and maritime Power interests, and the growing realization that ocean resources
were not boundless.13
After World War II, the International Law Commission, under the United Nation’s
direction, produced comprehensive reports on the subject of the law of the sea. Soon after, the
first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was called in Geneva, Switzerland in
1956 and resulted in four treaties on the issues, among others, of territorial sea, contiguous
zones, continental shelf, and the high seas.14 In 1960, a second UNCLOS was called to clarify
issues that were left unresolved but this convention proved to be unsuccessful in resolving these
issues. Between 1972 and 1982, a third UNCLOS was called and eventually resulted in a
comprehensive agreement on a codified law of the sea that replaced previous treaties and

9

United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), 2012, A Historical Perspective, accessed February 03,
2014,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Third%20Co
nference.
10
Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law
(Oxford University Press: New York, 2012), 372.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid., 373.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 851.
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conventions. The third UNCLOS, or as it has come to be known simply as “UNCLOS”, was
concluded in 1982 and came into force in 1994, with Guyana becoming the 60th state to sign the
treaty.15 Though the third UNCLOS agreement has become widely accepted as the governing
document for the law of the sea, with over 165 countries and the European Union having signed
the convention16, questions as to the legal status of the agreement remain, particularly as the
United States has not yet signed the convention and has only selectively endorsed some of its
provisions.17

Legal Standards for Maritime Territorial Dispute
UNCLOS
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in
1994, is an international treaty that established a “legal order” for the world’s seas and oceans.18
UNCLOS provides a regulatory framework for addressing, among other things, sovereignty,
territorial sea limits, legal status of resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and a binding procedure for settlement of disputes between States.19 A short
discussion of the major provisions20 of UNCLOS, as it pertains to the focus of this thesis,
follows.

15

United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), 2012, The Convention, accessed February 03, 2014,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Third%20Co
nference.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 851.
18
United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (1982), Preamble,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
19
United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), 2012, The Convention, accessed February 03, 2014
20
See Appendix A.0 for a diagram of UNCLOS legal zones
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Territorial Sea 21
Though the right of coastal states to extend sovereign control over waters beyond their
coastlines was always recognized under international law, the scope and limit of this control was
always in contention. Under UNCLOS, a coastal state has sovereignty to set laws, regulate use
and exploit resources, up to 12 nautical miles (nm) from its coastlines. This is regarded as
sovereign territory of the state and extends to the airspace and seabed within this region. If this
zone conflicts with another state’s territorial sea, the median point of both state’s territorial sea is
taken as the border, or it can otherwise be negotiated by the respective states.
Under UNCLOS, archipelagic states, which are states made up of a group of closely
spaced islands, have their 12nm territorial sea drawn from the outermost points of the outermost
islands of the group, where these islands are in close proximity to each other. The waters in
between these islands are under the sovereign control of the archipelagic state, subject to
innocent passage by foreign vessels.

Contiguous Zone22
This zone extends the 12nm jurisdiction from territorial sea to up to 12nm more, with
limited exercise of sovereignty, when there is no conflict with another state’s jurisdiction. This
could be more or less if it overlaps with another state’s contiguous zone. In this zone, coastal
states can implement certain rights to prevent certain violations and enforce their police powers.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)23

21

See Appendix B.5
See Appendix B.5
23
See Appendix B.5
22
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This confers “sovereign right” to a coastal state to exploit, develop and manage all
economic resources below the surface of the sea up to 200nm from the outer limit of its
territorial sea. However, the coastal state does not have full sovereignty to the EEZ. The surface
waters are still regarded as international waters.

Continental Shelf24
The continental shelf is a natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental
margin’s outer edge. The continental shelf may extend up to 200nm or can exceed up to 350nm
from the coastline if it is a natural prolongation, whichever is greater. Coastal states have
exclusive rights to resources attached to its continental shelf.

General Customs and Principles
In relation to territorial disputes, four species of territories exist - sovereign territory, trust
territory, terra nullius and res communis.25 Since sovereign territory and terra nullius are the
only ones that apply to the Spratly islands dispute, which is the main focus of this thesis, only
these will be discussed.
Sovereignty is a critical principle underlying territorial disputes. States possess the right
to control the land located within their territorial boundaries and to exclude other states from
being present without their consent.26 In recent times however, this notion of absolute state
sovereignty within its borders has become less absolute and more limited as the world moves
towards globalization and states increasingly become interdependent with each other.

24

See Appendix B.5
William Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 4th ed. (Belmont: Clark
Baxter, 2003), 246.
26
Ibid.
25
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States also routinely exercise their sovereignty in zones that have traditionally been the
heritage of all nations – sea, airspace, and outer space, areas that many states and their citizens
simultaneously occupy. Oceans, mountains, and other natural frontiers and barriers ordinarily
define territorial boundaries.27
Terra nullius are territories over which no state has control or exercises control and,
therefore, may be legally acquired under certain requirements. As a condition for establishing
sovereignty, states must establish that a particular territory was in fact terra nullius and therefore
available for occupation and a claim to title.28
As means for acquisition of sovereignty under international law, the traditional methods
of occupation, conquest, cession, prescription, and accretion, and modern methods, which
include renunciation, joint decision, and adjudication, are recognized.29 Since occupation,
cession, renunciation, and adjudication are the only ones that apply to the Spratly islands dispute,
only these will be discussed.
Exclusive occupation of a particular geographic area over an extended period of time is
the most common basis for claiming sovereignty. This mode of acquisition is an original claim to
a territory.30 This is similar to the common law principle of Squatter’s rights. Cession, on the
other hand, is an international agreement that deeds territory from one state to another. The
grantee state’s right to claim title to the granted land is a derived claim from that agreement.31
Renunciation, sometimes referred to as acquiescence, is when a state relinquishes its
territory or claim to a territory. In this method, there is no formal transfer of title as in treaty

27

Ibid., 247.
Ibid., 246-247.
29
Ibid., 247-256.
30
Ibid., 248.
31
Ibid., 250.
28
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cession.32 Finally, adjudication, as a method of legitimizing the transfer of sovereignty, is the
result of an international agreement that authorizes a tribunal to resolve the dispute, by
examining facts and rendering a decision, between the party states. Resolution through the
International Court of Justice falls under the category of arbitration.33

Decisions and Arbitrations
International jurisprudence, derived from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and other adjudicated cases, suggests that in the absence
of a definitive “legal title,” acquired through treaties and judicial decisions, the exercise of
effective authority becomes a decisive element in determining territorial sovereignty claims. The
Eritrea/Yemen decision from the PCA, which granted Yemen sovereignty over the Hanish
islands in the Red Sea, noted that the acquisition of territory in contemporary international law
generally requires “an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the
exercise of jurisdiction and state functions on a continuous and peaceful basis.”34 This legal
standard of ascertaining sovereignty claims has also prevailed in most instances against the
assertion of historic titles and titles by first discovery. Judge Alejandro Alvarez, who delivered
the declaration of the ICJ in Minquiers and Ecrehos, wrote that “the task of the Court is to
resolve international disputes by applying, not the traditional or classical international law, but
that which exists at the present day and which is in conformity with the new conditions of
international life, and to develop this law in a progressive spirit.”35

32

Ibid., 256.
Ibid.
34
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, October 9, 1998, accessed February
03, 2014, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160.
35
Minquiers and Ecrehos, ICJ 73 (1953).
33
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Early cases establish that actual displays of authority and evidence of possession
outweigh claims of historic sovereignty, when not continuously exercised. In Minquiers and
Ecrehos, the ICJ awarded the United Kingdom sovereignty over a group of islets and rocks in the
English Channel on the basis of evidence which relates directly to the possession of the islands,
in this case local administration for a long period of time and exercise of state functions. The
Court dismissed France’s claims of historic sovereignty during the eleventh and twelfth
century.36 In Island of Palmas, the PCA awarded the Netherlands East Indies, now Indonesia,
sovereignty over the island of Palmas based on continuous and peaceful display of state authority
during a long period of time. The PCA rejected the United States’ contention that it had acquired
sovereignty over the island because Spain, who ceded its title and claim over the island to the
United States in the Treaty of Paris, had acquired sovereignty over the island by being the first to
discover it. The PCA ruled that titles of discovery are inchoate titles that need continuous and
actual displays of sovereignty, and that inchoate titles cannot prevail over titles based on
continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. The PCA also ruled that contiguity, as a basis
for territorial sovereignty claim, has no foundation under international law.37
The Island of Palmas decision further noted that the principle of “continuous and
peaceful display of the functions of state,” as an important element in territorial sovereignty, is
not only based on established international jurisprudence and widely accepted doctrine, but is
recognized and applied even within federal states with internal territorial boundary issues (Island
of Palmas, PCA 1928). For example in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of State of Indiana v.

36
37

Ibid.
Island of Palmas, ICJ (1928).
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State of Kentucky and Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, prescription founded on length of time38 is
held as a valid and incontestable title39.
Even when there was a consideration of historic claims, in the case of inheritance from
colonial powers, the continuous and peaceful exercise of effective authority still determined the
sovereignty award. In Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, the ICJ considered ancient
historic claims of title on the basis of cession, or in this case inheritance, from colonial powers
rather than the basis of terra nullius, but only with the exercise of sovereignty as confirmation
for possession. In the same decision, the ICJ awarded the Meanguera, Meanguerita and the El
Tigre islands in the Gulf of Fonseca on the basis of a long standing occupation and control
without protest by another, as “pointing to acquiescence.”40 With this criterion, Meanguera and
Meangerita were awarded to El Salvador while El Tigre was awarded to Honduras.41
In some instances, effective authority does not have to be manifested in occupation,
although in most cases it is. The Clipperton Island arbitration acknowledged that the “actual, and
not the nominal, taking of possession” is a necessary condition for sovereignty and that “the acts,
or series of acts, by which the occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question
and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there” should follow.42 However, the arbitration
also acknowledged that in some instances it may be unnecessary to have recourse to this method
of perfecting sovereignty, especially where territory is uninhabitable, and that the requirement of
effective occupation may be unnecessary. The arbitration concluded:

38

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 US 657 (1838).
State of Indiana v. State of Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890).
40
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute ICJ 579 (1992).
41
Ibid.
42
"Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty over Clipperton
Island," American Journal of International Law 26, no. 2 (April 1932): 390, accessed January 02, 2014,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2189369.
39
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Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely uninhabited, is,
from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the
absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of
possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby
completed.43
In the Clipperton Island case, a sovereignty dispute over an uninhabitable island in the
eastern Pacific Ocean between France and Mexico was awarded to France on the basis that it had
perfected its sovereignty title by acquiring it under the concept of terra nullius and a notice of
French occupation, through the Government of Hawaii and published in a Honolulu newspaper,
despite the absence of effective occupation. The arbitration rejected Mexico’s contention that
France had not exercised effective occupation and therefore had not perfected its sovereignty
over the island.44
In the first instance of a Southeast Asian territorial dispute to be settled at the ICJ, the
Court reinforced prior decisions disregarding historic claims and requiring the continuous,
peaceful and effective exercise of authority for claiming sovereignty. In Sovereignty over Palau
Ligitan and Palau Sipadan, the Court awarded Malaysia sovereignty over the islands of Palau
Ligitan and Palau Sipadan in the Celebes Sea based on a show of superior “effectivities”, that is
evidence of actual and continued exercise of authority over the islands.45 In this case, Malaysia
and its predecessor the British colonial government had continually exercised authority for 88
years without protest until 1969. Examples of this exercise of authority included a 1917
ordinance regarding the taking of turtle eggs, a 1933 establishment of bird houses on Sipadan,

43

Ibid., 394.
Ibid.
45
Haller-Trost et al., The Territorial Dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau Sipadan
and Pulau Ligitan in the Celebes Sea, 1.
44
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construction of lighthouses on the two islands in 1962 and 1963, and various fishing licenses
handed out by the government. The Court rejected France’s claims based on colonial era maps
and vague treaties.46
Generally, the judicial decisions and arbitrations point to a pattern that when ambiguity
exists, the continuous and actual displays of authority, evidence of possession, and acquiescence
by other states to the exercise of sovereignty are of decisive importance in determining
sovereignty issues.47

Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution
In accordance with Article 2, Section 3 (Purpose and Principles) of the United Nations
(UN) Charter48, member states are mandated to seek a peaceful means, that which does not
endanger “international peace and security, and justice,” for resolving international disputes. In
Article 33, it is further elaborated that parties to a dispute can seek a solution through
“negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”49
The majority of disputes under international law are resolved through negotiations or
negotiations involving aspects of enquiry, mediation and conciliation.50 Negotiation is typically
conducted through “normal diplomatic channels”, that is by states’ respective foreign affairs
office or through the United Nations General Assembly.51 The use of arbitration and judicial

46

Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan ICJ (2002).
Lian A. Mito, "The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development in the Spratly Islands,"
American University International Law Review 13, no. 3 (1998): 733, accessed February 10, 2014, Digital
Commons.
48
See Appendix B.1
49
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 33, accessed February 10, 2014,
https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.
50
Carter and Trimble, International Law, 286.
51
Ibid., 288.
47
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settlement becomes necessary when diplomacy fails to resolve a contentious international
dispute.
UNCLOS established the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)52, an
independent judicial body, specifically to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretations
and application of the convention.53 Though signatory states are obligated to peacefully settle
any disputes arising from UNCLOS, the ITLOS is not the only means of doing this. Under
Article 287 of the UNCLOS provisions54, states can also freely choose to settle their disputes,
particularly concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS provisions, through the
International Court of Justice or other arbitral tribunals.
As the “principal judicial organ” of the UN, all member states are also “facto” parties to
the International Court of Justice, or otherwise known as the “World Court” and its statues.55
Each member of the UN is mandated to comply with ICJ decisions in any case to which they are
party. If parties to a case fail to comply with such decisions, the other party can have recourse
through the Security Council, which may “make recommendations or decide upon measures to
be taken to give to the judgment”.56 It is however noted that members are not prevented from
entrusting their disputes to other tribunals, if so agreed upon by the disputing parties.57
During the 1899 Hague Conventions, the Convention on the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes58 created the Permanent Court of Arbitration with the objective of

52

United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention
on the Law of The Sea (1982), Annex VI,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
53
"The Tribunal," International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, accessed February 10, 2014,
https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0.
54
See Appendix B.5
55
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 92-93, accessed February 10, 2014,
https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.
56
Ibid., 94.
57
Ibid., Article 95.
58
See Appendix B.3
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“facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences, which it has not
been possible to settle by diplomacy.”59 It was noted in the convention that in questions of legal
nature where international conventions are being interpreted or applied, arbitration was the most
effective and equitable means of settling such disputes, where diplomacy has failed.60 Compared
with the ICJ, the system of arbitration settles dispute between states by judges of their own
choice and on “the basis of respect for law.”61 It also noted in the revised 1902 articles of the
convention62 that recourse to arbitration implies “an engagement to submit in good faith to the
Award.”63 The Permanent Court of Arbitration has since become the default arbitral tribunal in
resolving UNCLOS provisions, pursuant to Article 287(c) of UNCLOS64. Since UNCLOS has
come into force in 1994, 9 cases have been acted upon or are pending in the tribunal’s registry.65

The Spratly Islands Dispute

Historical Background
Over a hundred years of colonial competition that started in the 1800’s have led to the
complication of the ownership of the Spratly islands. Towards the end of the nineteenth century,
Britain, France and Japan competed for sovereign control over the South China Sea. As the
French and British empires disintegrated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and

59

Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, Chapter I, Article 20, accessed February 10, 2014, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1187.
60
Ibid., Chapter I, Article 16.
61
Ibid., Article 37.
62
See Appendix B.4
63
Ibid.
64
See Appendix B.5
65
"Ad Hoc Arbitration Under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,"
Permanent Court of Arbitration, accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1288
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the withdrawal of Japanese forces at the end of World War II66, they left in their wake a series of
former colonial territories and ambiguous mechanisms to resolve territorial disputes67.
In modern times, the first exercise of effective control can be traced back to the Japanese
invasion and occupation in 1939. Garrisons were established in some islands and regular naval
patrols were carried out. The allocation of sovereignty could have been settled in the 1951 San
Francisco Peace treaty68 and the 1952 Japan-Taiwan Treaty69; however, western powers were
uninterested in settling ownership of the islands and viewed it as of little significance then. The
Japanese claims, along with any prior ones from France and purported Vietnamese claims before
France, effectively lapsed.70
Long known to navigators as “Dangerous Ground” because of its perilous area, the
islands’ former name has ominously described the evolution of the dispute in the South China
Sea.71 The islands drove away ships and vessels until geological studies in the 1970s showed the
possible existence of substantial petroleum and natural deposits beneath the seabed.72 Since then,
littoral states have become entangled in a web of overlapping and conflicting claims over the
sovereignty of the islands and its resources.73
The closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
withdrawal from the Cam Ranh Bay, and the end of the Cold War, left a power vacuum in the
66

Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who's On First?, vol. 2, series 1 (Durham:
International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 1996), 7, accessed February 1, 2014.
67
Xavier Furtado, "International Law and the Dispute Over the Spratly Islands: Whiter
UNCLOS?," Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 3 (1999): 387, accessed August 28, 2013, ProQuest.
68
See Appendix C.1
69
See Appendix C.2
70
Lee G. Cordner, "The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea," Ocean Development &
International Law 25, no. 1 (1994): 69, accessed January 05, 2014, Taylor & Francis.
71
Brantly Womack, "The Spratly: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord," Contemporary
Southeast Asia: A Journal Of International & Strategic Affairs, 3rd ser., 33 (2011): 373, accessed August
31, 2013, Academic Search Premier.
72
Ibid.,373.
73
Christopher Joyner, "The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy,
and Geo-politics in the South China Sea," The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 13, no. 2
(1998): 193, accessed August 27, 2013, Academic Search Premier.
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South China Sea that has prompted littoral states to re-evaluate their national security interests,
maritime jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty.74 While the People’s Republic of China (China),
the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Vietnam have traditionally claimed the whole of the Spratly
islands primarily based on historical grounds, sustained occupations by China since 1956, by
Vietnam since 1973, by the Philippines since 1971 and by Malaysia since 1983, complicate the
issue of whether ownership of the islands should be decided in whole or by parts.75

The South China Sea and the Spratly Islands
The South China Sea76 is a semi-enclosed sea that is bordered by Vietnam on the west by
the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei on the east, by Indonesia and Malaysia on the south, and by
China and Taiwan on the north. Around 90 percent of its circumference is surrounded by land
and its total area is approximately 550-650 nautical miles (nm) in width and 1200 nautical miles
(nm) in length.77
The Spratly islands are an archipelago located in the South China Sea. The archipelago
comprises of over one hundred widely scattered islands, islets, banks and rocks spread across a
surface area78 estimated to be around 410,000 square kilometers (km2) of water.79 Article 121(1)
of UNCLOS80, defines an island to be “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide".81 Under the UNCLOS definition, only forty of the Spratly
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features are considered islands, with the largest island spanning less than 1.7 kilometers (km).
The remaining features of the archipelago are either submerged under water or are above water
only during low tide.82
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam each claim the entirety of the Spratly island group. The
Philippines claims a number of the features that supposedly fall under its Kalayaan Island Group.
Malaysia claims some features according to provisions within UNCLOS, and Brunei claims one
reef that is within its 200nm EEZ. Over sixty of the Spratly features are reportedly occupied by
claimant countries83. The largest island, Itu Aba, is occupied by Taiwan. Vietnam reportedly
occupies twenty-five, the Philippines occupies eight, China occupies seven, Malaysia occupies
three and Taiwan occupies one.84

Significance of the Spratly Islands
The purported large natural reserves beneath the Spratly archipelago seabed and the
importance of the South China Sea to global maritime navigation give the dispute significant
regional and international importance. Additionally, China’s rise to international political and
military power has coincided with the relative decline of the United States’ global power.
Consequentially, the Spratly dispute does not merely revolve around territorial claims but it also
revolves around significant geo-strategic, economic, political and legal challenges.85
The features within the Spratly archipelago are mostly barren, uninhabitable and contain
little land resources. However, the features are strategically, politically and economically
important because they serve as legal base points for which claimant states can project
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jurisdiction over water and resources in the South China Sea.86 Although it is difficult to
accurately estimate the amount of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea because of the
ongoing territorial dispute and the lack of exploration, the United States Energy Information
Agency (EIA) roughly estimates that there are approximately 11 billion barrels (bbl) of oil
reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves in the South China Sea.87
Additionally, the USGS estimates that anywhere between 0.8 and 5.4 billion barrels of oil and
between 7.6 and 55.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves are within the Spratly
archipelago area.88
Asia’s rapid economic growth and increased demand for energy sources makes the
conflict even more contentious. The EIA estimates that liquid fuel consumption for selected
Asian countries, which include all of the Spratly claimants, will rise at an annual rate of 2.6
percent. By 2035, it is estimated that the Asian countries’ share of global oil consumption will
increase from 20% in 2008 to 30%. China is estimated to account for 43% of the growth. While
Southeast Asian oil consumption increases, domestic production is expected to remain flat or
decrease throughout this time. China also seeks to increase the share of natural gas in its energy
mix from 3% to 10% by 2020.89
The Spratly archipelago also holds geopolitical or geostrategic importance in global
maritime and military navigation. All maritime traffic traversing the South China Sea passes
through this archipelago and no global maritime power can ignore this sea.90 To the south-west,
the South China Sea connects with the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca and
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Singapore. To the north-east, it connects to the East China Sea, which in turn connects to the Sea
of Japan through the strait of Korea.91 In 2011, approximately 11 million barrels of oil per day92
and 6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas93 passed through this area. Additionally, 25% of world
shipping, 80% to 90% of Japanese and Chinese oil imports,94 and military fleets moving from the
Pacific to the Indian Ocean transit95 through here.96
Vital human security aspects also exist in the dispute. The South China Sea provides for
80% of the Philippine diet and over 25% of the protein needs of over 500 million people in the
region.97 The Asian diet is protein-heavy and coastal areas that surround the South China Sea
have increasingly dense populations.98
The Spratly dispute is also underscored by shifting global power dynamics. In July 2010,
U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during a speech to the ASEAN Regional Forum, said that
there was an American “national interest” in the area.99 While the United States does not have a
claim in the dispute, the rise of China’s economic and military power has threatened its influence
in the region. China may still not compare to the United States’ global military reach but the
United States will no longer have unchallenged influence in Asia. As the global power, the
United States is concerned about maintaining global order. Thus its interests do not merely lie in
conflict resolution; it is also interested in maintaining the balance of power in the region. “The
91
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role of global peace-keeping”, as Womack puts it, “is more one of peace-holding than of peacemaking”.100 Finally, the extensive trade and debt connection between the United States and
China forces the former to cautiously deal with the latter, despite strong alliances with ASEAN
countries, unless it wants to risk domestic economic repercussions.101

Competing Claims and Analysis
It is important to note that while China, Taiwan and Vietnam base their respective claims
primarily on historic rights over the Spratly archipelago; the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei
base their respective claims on geographic proximity provisions under UNCLOS. Consequently,
China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the whole archipelago, while the Philippines, Malaysia and
Brunei only claim certain islands or features in the archipelago102.

China103
China’s claims are based on the assertion of historical sovereignty and occupation over
the South China Sea. Claims on the archipelago purportedly date back to the ancient Chinese
dynasties, with some claims dating back to as early as the Han Dynasty in the Second Century
B.C.104 Ancient Chinese maps, texts and reports of commercial and naval activity in the area105
show that it was the first to discover and occupy these islands and its surrounding features.106
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China contends that prior to their discovery and occupation of the archipelago, the Spratlys were
terra nullius.107
China’s earliest formal claim came in 1887 when the Convention Respecting the
Delimitation of the Frontier Between China and Tonkin was signed.108 At the conclusion of the
Sino-French War, delimitation lines between French and Chinese territories in the South China
Sea was outlined. Despite having ambiguous provisions, China used these provisions and made
attempts to exert control on the South China Sea towards the end and the early part of the 18th
and 19th centuries.109 The conclusion of World War II, with ambiguous delimitation of territories,
and the collapse of the French empire made the claims more confusing.110
Between 1946 and 1947, China published official names for the islands and features in
the Spratly archipelago and incorporated them into the Guangdong province. China has since
included the Spratly archipelago into the province of Hainan, which was established in July
1987.111 China also started to publish tongue shaped112, interrupted line maps that showed its
jurisdiction over all of South China Sea around the late 1940s113. In 1951, China’s Foreign
Minister outlined Beijing’s official position in response to the draft of the San Francisco Treaty:
In fact, the Paracel Archipelago and Spratly Island, as well as the whole Spratly
Archipelago … have always been Chinese territory. Though occupied for some
time during the war of aggression unleashed by Japanese imperialism, they were
taken over by the then Chinese government following Japan’s surrender. The
Central People’s Republic of China declares herewith: The inviolable sovereignty
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of the People’s Republic of China over Spratly islands and the Paracel
Archipelago will by no means be impaired, irrespective of whether the AmericanBritish draft for a peace treaty with Japan should make any stipulations and of the
nature of any such stipulations.114
The first assertion of effective control over the archipelago came in March 1988, when
there was a brief naval engagement with Vietnamese forces that sank three transport vessels and
killed 72 Vietnamese troops. China subsequently took possession of several features of the
archipelago and established a base and airstrip in Fiery Cross Reef.115 In February 1992, China
further reinforced its legal claims by passing a special territorial sea and contiguous zone act.
This legislation identifies the Spratly archipelago as part of Chinese territory. In Article 2, it
asserts:
The PRC's territorial sea refers to the waters adjacent to its territorial land.
The PRC's territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan
and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands,
Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other
islands that belong to the People's Republic of China.
The PRC's internal waters refer to the waters along the baseline of the territorial
sea facing the land.116
Since 1998, China has also deployed marines and established garrisons on other
islands.117 China continues to maintain occupation on some islands and features, to reinforce its
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claims under contemporary international law, while simultaneously claiming sovereignty over
the whole archipelago based on historical claims.
Analysis
Ancient records that China claims to show it as first to discover and occupy the
archipelago are at best sparse and incomplete. The ancient records do not show compelling
evidence of regular occupation administration or sovereign control over the Spratly
archipelago.118 The identification of the Spratly archipelago in ancient records has also been
vague because they frequently changed the names. It was not until 1934 when China began to
use the name “Nansha islands” to identify the Spratly archipelago. Conflicting records also show
that some reports do not include the Spratly archipelago as part of Chinese territory.119
Furthermore, China’s assertion of historical discovery seems to have little weight under
international law. Discovery does not grant immediate sovereignty, rather it grants an inchoate
title which must be substantiated by “continuous acts of occupation”.120
While it has claimed ancient and historic sovereignty over the archipelago, issued legal
declarations in 1958 and 1992, and consistently lodged diplomatic protests over the activities of
other states in the area, “effective control” seems to only be evident from 1988 onwards.121
PRC’s effective control over some features of the archipelago did not start until this time.
Despite basing its claims on historical arguments, China has nevertheless ratified UNCLOS, as
have other countries that have a claim to the archipelago.122
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Though it seems to have satisfied the concept of effective control of some of the islands
that it has occupied since 1988, it is difficult for China to justify its claim to the entirety of the
archipelago, as it does not effectively occupy nor control a majority of the islands or features.
The only basis for a claim to the whole archipelago comes from an assertion of historical
sovereignty, which is not only legally weak but at best sparse and incomplete. While China’s
case seems to be weak, its recent strong and persistent physical presence, and its rising global
power, makes it unlikely that its claims can be ignored.123

Taiwan124
Taiwan’s claims are similarly based on Chinese claims of historical discovery and
occupation. China and Taiwan both claim that the Spratly archipelago and other islands in the
South China Sea have been Chinese territory “since ancient times”.125 Known collectively as the
“Tongue of the Dragon”, the islands in the South China Sea are seen as inseparable from
China126. However, since the separation of China and Taiwan, separate attempts at occupying
and administering the archipelago have been pursued.127 Taiwan further claims to be the first
government to occupy, through physical presence, part of the Spratly archipelago and the first to
assert effective control and authority in the area.128
When Japan invaded the island of Hainan in 1939, it placed the nearby Spratly
archipelago under Taiwanese jurisdiction. With the withdrawal of Japanese forces at the end of
World War II, Taiwan stationed troops on Itu Aba, the largest island in the Spratly
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archipelago129. Taiwanese forces remained until 1948 when they were withdrawn because of the
Chinese civil war, but were subsequently redeployed in 1956 and have since remained.130
Taiwan has since fortified its Itu Aba presence and erected boundary markers in several other
features of the Spratly archipelago.131
The 1952 Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, which was
negotiated by Taiwan because there was no Chinese delegation at the 1951 San Francisco Peace
Conference, has also been used to assert that sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago devolved
from Japanese to Chinese jurisdiction. Since no Chinese delegation participated in the 1951 San
Francisco Treaty because the United States and its allies could not agree on which government
represented China, Taiwan (The Republic of China) negotiated a separate peace treaty. The
treaty states that Japan has “renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu
(the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.”132
Analysis
Taiwan appears to have effectively continuously controlled and administered Itu Aba, the
largest island in the archipelago, since 1956, if not 1948. This may qualify as a display of
continuous and peaceful sovereignty over the island.133 This control, however, did not extend to
the other islands or features and occupation by other states in other parts of the archipelago was
not really challenged by Taiwan.134 As Taiwan claims sovereignty of the whole archipelago, the
weaknesses of its claims are similar to that of China – while having effective control and
occupation of some islands, it does not extend to the rest of the archipelago. Its claim to the
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whole archipelago, similar to China’s, is of historical sovereignty, already deemed as insufficient
without continuous control and effective administration.
Taiwan has also argued that implicit mention of the Spratly archipelago in the 1952
Japanese-Taiwan treaty implies Japanese recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the islands and
its features, particularly because all the other territories mentioned are Chinese territories.135 This
argument is based on the concept of cession, but without an explicit treaty that transfers
ownership of the archipelago, back at the time when the Japanese was purported to exercise
sovereignty, it is at best speculation.

Vietnam136
Vietnam’s claims are based on historic occupation and administration, as well as colonial
inheritance137. It claims that Vietnamese emperors have administered the archipelago since the
Nguyen dynasty in the 17th to 19th centuries.138 Vietnam published white papers and supported its
historical claims by including maps and records of ancient activities in the Spratly islands and
features since the 17th century.139 In a 1975 government white paper, Vietnam affirmed its
sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) and Trung Sa (Spratly Islands) archipelagos. It
asserts that:
The Republic of Vietnam fulfils all the conditions required by international law to
assert its claim to possession of these islands. Throughout the course of history,
the Vietnamese had already accomplished the gradual consolidation of their rights
on the Hoang Sa Islands. By the early 19th century, a systematic policy of
135
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effective occupation was implemented by Vietnamese emperors. The Truong Sa
Islands, known to and exploited by Vietnamese fishermen and laborers for many
centuries, were formally incorporated into Vietnamese territory by France on
behalf of Vietnam. On both archipelagoes, Vietnamese civil servants assured a
peaceful and effective exercise of Vietnamese jurisdiction. The continuous
display of state authority was coupled with the constant Vietnamese will to
remain the owner of a legitimate title over those islands. Thus military defense of
the archipelagoes and diplomatic activities were put forth in the face of false
claims from other countries in the area.140
Vietnam further claims that while it subsequently lost effective administration, following
a Chinese invasion, it had regained rights to the archipelago during independence from France
when it inherited its territorial holdings in the area.141 It claims the right of cession from a French
claim to the archipelago that dates back to 1933.142
In 1973 and 1975, Vietnam moved to secure its claims by occupying thirteen islands of
the Spratly archipelago. It further occupied three more in 1989 and has since taken more
features143, stationed troops on several Spratly formations and published maps incorporating the
Spratly archipelago into Vietnamese territory144.
Analysis
Vietnam’s claims of historic occupation, substantiated by maps and records of activities,
suffer from the same problems as antiquated documents put forward by China and Taiwan. Most
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of the ancient maps and records specifically refer to the Paracel archipelago, another disputed
archipelago in the region, and only implied reference to the Spratly archipelago exists.145 There
are also doubts on whether or not these documents are authentic and accurate. Such doubts, as
Christopher Joyner argues, is why “international law usually regards mere historical claims,
without evident occupation and permanent settlement, as only arguably binding and susceptible
to legal challenge for assuring valid claim to title over territory in the oceans”.146
The claim of right to cession from the French is not supported by the fact that France
lacked a legitimate claim over the archipelago. France did not have colonial control or any lawful
title to the Spratly archipelago nor was there any French claim to the entire archipelago147. The
French did not even make any effort in perfecting any title it may have had over the archipelago
when it did not return after Japan relinquished its claim over the territories at the end of World
War II.148
Vietnam has, however, controlled many features and has maintained occupation in the
Spratly archipelago since 1973. However, control and occupation, as in China’s and Taiwan’s
cases, does not extend to the entirety of the archipelago.149
Vietnam, however, potentially has a strong continental shelf claim to the western part of
the Spratly archipelago. The continental shelf extending from the south and east part of the
Mekong delta is relatively shallow, and as prescribed under UNCLOS Article 76(1)150, the area
seems to be a “natural prolongation” of the land territory. A continental shelf that extends to
350nm could be justified under UNCLOS Article 76(5). 151
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Philippines152
The Philippines’ claims are based on discovery of certain islands and features in the
Spratly archipelago, subsequent annexation and geographic proximity. In 1956, Tomas Cloma, a
private Filipino citizen, claimed he had discovered a group of islands in the South China Sea and
declared a new island state called “Kalayaan”, which means “freedom” in English.153 Cloma
continued to claim these islands until 1974, when a “Deed of Assignment and Waiver of Rights”
was signed to transfer ownership of the islands to the Philippine government.154
The Philippine government maintains that before Cloma’s discovery of the islands, they
were terra nullius following the Japanese renunciation over territories in the South China Sea.
Therefore, when Cloma laid claims to the islands155, which at that point was not under any state’s
sovereign control, he acquired ownership of the islands under international law.156
Due to threats of occupation by other countries in 1968, the Philippines occupied eight
of the islands claimed by Cloma. Responding to an incident where Vietnamese troops on Itu Aba
fired upon a Philippine fishing vessel in 1971157, the Philippine government lodged official
protests158 against Vietnam and moved to lay official claims to the islands.159 In 1978, the then
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos issued Decree 1596160 and annexed the islands by
incorporating them into the Palawan province.161 The decree asserted:
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WHEREAS, these areas do not legally belong to any state or nation but, by reason
of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in
accordance with the international law, such areas must now deemed to belong and
subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines162
Interestingly enough, the Philippine official position acknowledges that it has no claim to
the Spratly archipelago. It asserts, however, that the islands in the Kalayaan group are not part of
the Spratly archipelago163 and are in fact a part of the natural extension of the Philippine
continental shelf.164 Based on the provisions of UNCLOS, the Philippines further argues that the
Kalayaan group of islands falls within its legitimate 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone.165
The Philippines has continued to maintain its occupation in the Kalayaan group of islands
since it was first occupied in 1971. It has also erected garrisons, stationed marines and
established an airstrip on one of the islands166. These bases have also been fortified with heavy
artillery, equipped with radar facilities, weather stations and ammunition depots.167
Analysis
The Philippine claim of terra nullius discovery by Cloma rests on the argument that
before 1956, the Spratly archipelago and more specifically the islands in the claimed Kalayaan
group, was not part of or under the sovereign control of any other state168; hence, when Cloma
discovered the islands, he acquired sovereignty over them. Cloma’s claim of sovereignty is
however weak. Indeed, Japan relinquished all sovereignty claims in the South China Sea,
including the Spratly archipelago, during the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. However, China,
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Vietnam and Taiwan argue that the Spratly archipelago was not terra nullius at that point but
was in fact under each states’ sovereign authority.169 Furthermore, no government recognized the
lawfulness of Cloma’s state170 and international law gives little value to independent activities of
individuals.171
The Philippines seems to have, however, sustained and continuously occupied the
Kalayaan group since 1971, and effectively administered it since 1978, when it was declared a
part of the Palawan province. This occupation and control, however, is only contained within the
claimed Kalayaan group of islands and does not extend to the whole Spratly archipelago, to
which the Philippines refers as distinct and separate anyway.
The Philippine claim based on UNCLOS seems to have more validity, but not without
contention. Article 48 of UNCLOS permits an archipelago state, like the Philippines, to extend
an EEZ and a continental shelf from its archipelagic coastlines.172 As it has argued, the Kalayaan
group of islands falls within the Philippines’ legitimate Exclusive Economic Zone. Furthermore,
UNCLOS deems waters in between the islands of archipelagic states as historical sovereign
territory. However, other claimants question this interpretation because they argue that the
UNCLOS provisions regarding EEZ apply only to areas or zones that have previously been a
part of the high seas. As China, Taiwan and Vietnam continue to argue, these islands were not a
part of the high seas and were a part of their sovereign control.173
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Malaysia174
Malaysia’s claims are based on geographic proximity, specifically continental shelf
provisions in UNCLOS. Its claims date back to 1979, when the Malaysian government first
published a map showing the country’s continental shelf and EEZ extending into the
southernmost part of the Spratly archipelago.175 It asserts that prior to its claims, the islands
being claimed were terra nullius.
Malaysia asserts that it has sovereign control over all the islands and features within its
continental shelf and cites the 1958 Geneva Convention on territorial waters and continental
shelf boundaries, as well as UNCLOS provisions, to support its delimitations.176 In 1984,
Malaysia enacted an Exclusive Economic Zone Act (Act 311) and declared that within its EEZ, it
has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether
living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the
superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for
the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents
and winds;
(b) jurisdiction with regard to—
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
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(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine
environment; and
(c) such other rights and duties as are provided for by
international law.177
Malaysia is also the most recent claimant to the archipelago and the most recent to
occupy features within it. It claims sovereignty over twelve islands in the Spratly archipelago. In
late 1977, Malaysia stationed troops on Swallow Reef and has since stationed more on some of
the features to which it lays claims.178
Analysis
Although Malaysia’s continental shelf claims, which are based on ocean law principles in
UNCLOS, seems to have legitimacy, the use of these continental shelves provisions to assert
sovereignty over the Spratly features seems to be misinterpreted and misplaced. UNCLOS
allows states with established sovereignty over islands to control living and non-living resources
within its continental shelves, but it has no provisions granting sovereignty over islands within
the continental shelves179, especially if these islands already fall within the jurisdiction of another
state.180
Article 76 of UNCLOS181 defines a continental shelf to be “the submerged prolongation
of the land mass of the coastal State, [which] consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the
slope and the rise.”182 While Malaysia has used this provision to claim the Spratly features, there
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are no provisions within UNCLOS that refers to islands, rocks or other features of the continental
shelf that rise above sea-level.183
The critical question of the acquisition of sovereignty over island formations, in this case,
seems not to be support by UNCLOS. It is also unlikely that the drafters of the provisions
envisioned such interpretations184. Rather under international law, it is still a demonstration of
continuous and effective display of permanent occupation.185 Indeed, Malaysia has reinforced its
claims by establishing garrisons on several of its claimed Spratly features.
Malaysia has effectively controlled one feature since 1983 and two others since 1986.
Only Swallow Reef, which is one of the features under its control, is also claimed as an island.
The two other features are claimed as “low tide elevations” but are beyond the territorial sea of
the mainland. Under UNCLOS Article 13186, this cannot form the basis for the extension of the
territorial sea.187 Swallow Reef seems to satisfy the “Regime of Islands”.188
While the military garrisons reinforce Malaysia’s claims of effective control, it is the
most recent country to occupy features in the Spratly group. The duration of its control in the
occupied features is yet to be seen as whether or not “permanent occupation” can be established
is still in question because the ability to “sustain human habitation or economic life of its own” is
unlikely.189 Malaysia does not claim an extension of the continental shelf or EEZ based on this
feature.190
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Amboyna Cay, the other feature for which Malaysia claims a 12nm territorial sea, raises
questions of effective control. A Vietnamese garrison was established on the feature several
years prior to Malaysia’s claims and remains to the present. This legal claim is harmed by the
prolonged occupation of another state.191

Brunei192
Similarly to Malaysia, Brunei bases its claims solely on geographic proximity provisions
under UNCLOS. Brunei, however, only claims Louisa Reef, which is a naturally submerged
formation in the archipelago. It also only claims maritime jurisdiction around the Reef, without
contesting the sovereignty of the formation or any other Spratly features.193
Brunei uses continental shelf provisions within UNCLOS to claim Louisa Reef and
exclusive right to exploit the resources of the reef.194 Brunei claims that because Louisa Reef is a
naturally submerged formation that falls within its 200nm EEZ, it is legally subject to an
extension of its continental shelf.195
Its claim originated from continental shelf delimitation first established by the United
Kingdom in 1954. Though there have been a series of negotiations, Malaysia and Brunei
continue to have incompatible delimitations between its adjacent maritime boundaries,
consequently Louisa Reef falls within those disputed delimitations.196 To date, Brunei remains
the only claimant without a military or physical presence in the Spratly archipelago. It is also the
most recent claimant, so documentation about its claims are lacking.
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Analysis
Unlike Malaysia’s claim to the Spratly features, Louisa Reef is a naturally submerged
formation that falls within a prescribed continental shelf. Under UNCLOS provisions, a “natural
prolongation seaward from the coastal territory” of Brunei would fall within its maritime
jurisdiction. Settlement is neither needed nor possible to demonstrate ownership197. With this
particular interpretation, Brunei seems to have a strong legal claim to Louisa Reef.
Brunei’s claim on Louisa Reef however suffers from practical limitations. Though there
is no need to establish continuous and effective occupation, as permanent occupation is
impossible in submerged formations, Malaysia has been in control of Louisa Reef since 1984.198
While Brunei has also expressed willingness to invoke Article 83 of UNCLOS199, which enjoins
parties to refer unsuccessful bilateral negotiations to the International Court of Justice, to bring a
solution to Malaysia and Brunei’s disputed delimitations, the multilateral nature of this dispute
make this solution impractical.200
Brunei’s claim over the Louisa Reef area seems to be consistent with the provisions of
UNCLOS Article 76(1), subject to the resolution of a delimitation agreement with Malaysia, as
prescribed by Article 83. While the Louisa Reef area is within 200 nautical miles of its coast,
Brunei has also recently made claims beyond Rifleman Bank. Rifleman Bank lies approximately
250nm off the shore and seems to be in excess of the “natural progression” of the continental
shelf, which is broken by East Palawan Trough, 60 to 100nm off the coast.
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Summary Analysis
Historic claims made by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, seem to have little basis under
contemporary international law. These countries’ maps, records and antiquated evidence of
purported control at some point in time or some part of the geography of the Spratly archipelago
have certainly not been continuous or unqualifiedly effective. The United Nations Convention on
Law of the Sea, whose provisions the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei heavily rely upon for
their claims, does not contain clear guidelines that can decisively resolve the states’ conflicting
claims. Rather, UNCLOS provisions are selectively used by each state to advance its respective
claims, leading to more contention. While each of the claimant states have conspicuously tried to
bring their claims in line with the modern principles of acquisition of sovereignty under
international law, that is display authority, establish continuous control of the islands or features,
and the relevant UNCLOS provisions, any ongoing exercise of sovereignty has not been without
contention or peaceful acquiescence other states, as a condition for reinforcing the legality of
claims.

Alternative Frameworks for Dispute Resolution

Towards Political and Diplomatic Frameworks
Though all the states disputing Spratly ownership are obliged under UNCLOS to resolve
their dispute and are all de facto parties to the ICJ by virtue of being a UN member, the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, as described in Article 36 of its statute201, primarily relies on consent of
the parties.202 Due to the complexity of the claims and the number of countries involved, it is
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difficult for the disputing states to find a consensus to accept an ICJ settlement, as its precedents
run contrary to the claims of the most powerful states involved, particularly China. The ICJ’s
effectiveness is also hampered by enforcement concerns, rigid procedures and the long time
periods it takes to make decisions.203 China is also a veto-wielding member of the Security
Council and can block any measures by the ICJ to enforce a decision contrary to its claims. The
same problems can be seen with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
Arbitration, though holding some potential to resolve the Spratly dispute, is limited by
the complexity of the dispute. Though arbitration is seen as procedurally less formal and rigid,
easier to enforce, generally more expeditious and employing a more neutral decision making
body than an international judicial body, since arbitrators of equal number come from the
respective parties to a case, the complexity of claims and the number of disputing parties in the
Spratly dispute complicate a resolution through this means.204 In a recently instituted arbitral
proceeding filed by the Philippines against China in the PCA over claims to certain parts of the
Spratly archipelago, China refused to consent to the arbitration.205 Even if China did submit to a
binding arbitration, the bilateral resolution would not solve the multilateral dispute at hand.
In 2002 the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which the Philippines,
Malaysia and Brunei are members of, and China signed a declaration of conduct in the South
China Sea and committed to pursuing efforts to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional
disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned.”206 This declaration
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affirmed already established obligations to resolve their dispute through peaceful means under
the United Nations Charter. It is logical then that alternative methods of dispute resolution,
particularly political and diplomatic solutions, should be explored.

Semi-Enclosed Sea and Joint Development
An approach to a settlement would be to declare the South China Sea as a semi enclosed
sea, setting aside the sovereignty questions, to allow a mutually beneficial development and
exploitation of resources. UNCLOS Article 123207 urges bordering states in a “semi-enclosed
sea” to cooperate in the “coordination” of resource management, environmental preservation and
scientific research. The northern and southern extremities of the South China Sea are “connected
to another sea or ocean (the Pacific and Indian oceans) by a narrow outlet (Malacca, Sunda
Straits and straits between Taiwan, PRC and Philippines)” which is “surrounded by two or more
States,” and will ultimately consist “primarily of the territorial seas and EEZs of two or more
coastal states.”208
The Timor Gap Treaty209 between Australia and Indonesia serves as an example of a
successful joint development area. In 1972, a gap was created in the seabed boundary between
Eastern Timor and Australia after Australia and Indonesia signed treaties establishing boundaries
east of Papua New Guinea and an area south of the West Timor. Unsuccessful boundary
negotiations between Portugal, which controlled East Timor at the time, and Australia resulted in
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the gap in the Timor Sea. In 1974, reports of significant potential of oil and gas production in the
region spurred new rounds of boundary negotiations to permanently close the gap.210
Australia claimed that the Timor Trough, a submarine trench located 40nm to 70nm from
the coastline of Timor, was a natural prolongation of the outer boundary of the Australian
continental shelf. Indonesia, on the other hand, claimed that a single continuous continental shelf
separated Australia and Timor, and argued that a median line from each country’s coastline
should be used as the boundary. With neither parties willing to compromise claims, Australia
suggested a joint development zone.211 In 1989, the Timor Gap Treaty resolved a seventeen-year
dispute over seabed boundary delimitations212 by establishing a “zone of cooperation” for
exploring further possibilities of and exploiting natural resources.213
The classification of the South China Sea as a semi-enclosed sea is still highly debatable.
The northern extremities of the sea do not easily fit the description of “narrow outlets” 214 and
joint development ventures could be achieved anyway without the legal designation of a semienclosed sea. However, a joint development area in itself may hold promise but not without
serious difficulties. The Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia served as an
alternative compromise because neither Australia nor Indonesia were willing to concede or
compromise their territorial claims over the Timor gap215, a situation familiar to the
uncompromising positions of the Spratly claimants. While China has shown willingness to
discuss joint development ventures, other countries such as the Philippines, are adamant about
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sovereignty claims.216 Furthermore, while bi-lateral treaties for a joint development authority
such as that in Timor Gap may have been successful, a joint development authority among six
states would raise serious difficulties in organization and management.

International Marine Peace Park
Another approach to settlement is establishing a “peace park” where sovereignty claims
would be temporarily suspended, for a defined period with optional renewal and extension. As
the International Union for Conservation of Nature has defined it, peace parks are
“transboundary protected areas that are formally dedicated to the protection and maintenance of
biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and to the promotion of
peace and cooperation.”217
In 1932, the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park (WGIPP) was created between
the governments of Canada and the United States and became the first peace park ever created.
The previously separated Waterton Lakes National Park in the U.S. and Glacier National Park in
Canada was designated as units of a single international peace park. While the designation of the
area as a “peace park” did not impact any country’s national sovereignty, the effective
management of this park required close coordination and collaboration between the two
countries. As such, the cooperation has led to improved research on natural resources, expedient
search and rescue operations, enhanced tourism, and partnerships extending beyond the peace
park.218
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In, 1994, the Red Sea Marine Peace Park (RSMPP) was established between Israel and
Jordan in the northern gulf of Aqaba. As an effort to normalize relations between the two
countries, Jordan’s Aqaba Marine Peace Park and Israel’s Coral Reef Reserve were incorporated
into the RSMPP. Similar to the WGIPP, the designation called on the two countries to coordinate
research on marine biology and coral reefs, and coordinate policies on marine resource
preservation. This resulted in full partnerships between resource management agencies and
marine research institutions in Jordan and Israel, increasing information sharing, coordination of
activities, and regular discussion and meetings regarding ongoing trends.219
The WGIPP between the United States and Canada and the RSMPP between Israel and
Jordan show the tangible benefits of peace parks between transnational boundaries. While the
United States and Canada may already have had a long history of peaceful interaction before the
WGIPP was created, the same could not be said of Jordan and Israel before RSMPP. Regardless
of the countries’ relations before these peace parks were established, the focus on cooperation in
research and marine preservation served to de-escalate tensions between borders and coordinate
policies in order to achieve common goals. This framework might well serve the Spratly dispute
and its claimants because the exploration and preservation of resources vital to the surrounding
countries are goals that all the disputing states share.
It is worth noting that any peace park framework must take into account the challenges
posed by the number of countries involved in the Spratly dispute and the unusual complexity of
claims and interests at play. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty220 serves as an example of a successful
multilateral peace park that can be modeled after. Similar to the conditions of state relations in
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the Spratly dispute, the Antarctic Treaty was brought about as a result of several states’ rising
tensions and overlapping claims to the region. In 1948, the United States spearheaded an
initiative to peacefully resolve the conflicting claims over Antarctica221. Though the initial
proposals were unsuccessful because of significant differences of opinion in the acquisition and
maintenance of territorial sovereignty, circumstances again closely resembling that of the
Spratlys dispute, this eventually lead to the successful signing of the Antarctic Treaty between
twelve countries in 1959.222
The Antarctic Treaty is built on multilateral cooperation on scientific research and
conservation activities while at the same time promoting de-escalation of conflict. The legal
importance of a framework such as this, specifically for the Spratly dispute, would be for
disputing states to be able to halt their assertions and protests during the duration of the treaty
and reduce regional tensions, without prejudicing their legal positions.223 As Kuan Ming-Sun
argues, “the present problem [Spratly dispute] does not lie in the detailed techniques of
demarcation of maritime boundaries”.224 Rather, the problem is the “fundamental question – who
owns what?”225
Because of historical, cultural and psychological aspects of the Spratly dispute, it is
difficult to reach a legal and political arrangement while tensions are continuously rising. The
Antarctic Treaty serves as a successful multilateral model for building an international peace
park that would temporarily hold off on the contentious questions of sovereignty and focus on
the promotion of peace and development efforts in the interim. However, it is not yet seen how
221
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such an arrangement could be arrived since none of the disputing states have expressed an
interest to lead an initiative to develop such an arrangement, as the United States did during the
negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. Perhaps the United Nations or a neutral third party state
could take the lead and be the catalyst for such an arrangement. This has yet to happen.

Mixed or Joint Commissions
In similar disputes that have been continuously problematic, a situation that may require
“continuous supervision”, mixed or joint commissions have been created as a means of
institutionalizing negotiations. These commissions usually consist of an equal number of
representatives from parties that may be given the task of dealing with a specific problem or a
broad brief for an indefinite duration. The Canadian-United States International Joint
Commission (CUIJC), as an example, has dealt with a large number of issues concerning
industrial development, air pollution and boundary waters since its creation in 1909.226
The CUIJC was established as a six-member quasi-judicial body, where Canada and the
United States appoint three commissioners each.227 Recognizing the need to find a permanent
mechanism to continuously resolve problems and motivated by the desire to resolve tensions
along the Canadian-United States border with equal treatment for both sides, the CUIJC was set
up to adjudicate, investigate and arbitrate disputed issues during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.228 It has since developed into a successful framework for dealing with
changing bilateral issues and concerns, and has been internationally recognized as an innovative
model for dispute resolution.
226
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The CUIJC has been a successful framework because of the legitimacy it has achieved
by being impartial. Though there are three commissioners from each side, decisions are rarely
split along national lines. Instead, the six commissioners seek consensus in making decisions.
Even though the commissioners are citizens of their respective countries and are in many cases
former government officials of their respective countries themselves, the independence of the
commission from government control promotes a collegial approach to resolving conflicts.229
While holding similar promises as arbitration, the joint or mixed commission framework,
which is exemplified by the CUIJC, has more advantages for the Spratly dispute. Having
commissioners coming from each country sit on a permanent independent body that continuously
arbitrate and adjudicate sovereignty claims and border tensions as they arise may serve to slowly
but sustainably diffuse the conflict in the long term. This has more advantages than simple
arbitration, where contentious questions of sovereignty would be decided all at once. Deciding
specific but limited issues of contention as they come up, such as boundary delimitations or
sovereignty claims over individual islands, and having the decisions be made by an independent
regional commission that equally represents all the parties concerned, may have more legitimacy
and weight than an international arbitration body. However, the challenges lie in organizing a
commission between six countries and working out the specifics of whether all countries are
going to be represented or not, since not all disputing countries claim the whole Spratly
archipelago. While the CUIJC has handed out decisions based on near unanimous consensus of
all commissioners, it is not yet seen if a joint or mixed commission between four to six countries
can arrive at decisions with the same unanimity, or if this dispute, because of deep historical and
cultural tensions in the region, may hinder the impartiality of the commissioners and split the
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voting block down national lines. A joint or mixed commission holds promise but not without
serious challenges in structure and jurisdiction that must be worked out based on the consensus
and agreement of all the disputing states beforehand.

Functional Framework
Another possibility is a functional approach to a resolution, to identify and split different
strands of the issues at the heart of the dispute to allow each sate to obtain satisfactory
settlements. In a solution to a disputed maritime delimitation in the Torres Strait between
Australia and Papua New Guinea, the parties negotiated an agreement that separately dealt with
interests of native inhabitants of the islands in the strait, the status of the islands, seabed
jurisdiction, fisheries jurisdiction, conservation and maritime rights.230 The 1978 Torres Straight
Treaty231 took almost a decade to be negotiated and agreed upon but it resolved “many social,
legal, political and economic questions”232 that were being disputed in the Torres Strait area.
Similar to the Torres Strait area before the 1978 treaty, the Spratly islands dispute has
yielded unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a single maritime boundary resolution for the
competing states because of the different strands of interests at play. A functional framework that
seeks to negotiate and resolve individual strands of the conflict may well serve to minimize the
complexity and overlapping contentions of the Spratly claimants.
While a functional framework might serve to minimize the complexity of the Spratly
dispute by dissecting the different political, legal and economic issues at play and seeking to
specifically address all of them, it does not seem that the disputing states are, at least at this point
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in time, ready for the intense negotiations that this kind of framework needs. Because of the
current trend of rising tensions and animosity between the disputing states, this framework may
hold greater promise after a temporary cessation to the rising tensions. Only after a period of deescalation of tensions in the region may this framework become relevant and perhaps hold
greater promise for pacifically resolving the dispute.

Conclusions
International law obligates the pacific settlement of and offers several methods for
resolving territorial sovereignty disputes. However, the Spratly islands dispute poses significant
challenges for traditional methods of conflict resolution. This dispute is embedded with
numerous conflicting parties and conflicting claims, and laden with significant international
legal, political, historical, and economic interests. As Dzurek puts it, the ongoing conflict is “a
complex tapestry”, the threads of which “stretch into antiquity.”233
While judicial and quasi-judicial avenues, through the International Court of Justice or
international arbitration bodies, have been limited in bringing about a successful resolution, there
are several political and diplomatic frameworks that can be explored and applied to resolve the
Spratly dispute. Joint development areas, peace parks, joint commissions and functional
frameworks offer alternative routes for conflict resolution. They have been applied successfully
in resolving disputes across the world.
The path to resolution, however, will ultimately depend on the willingness of the
disputing states to set aside their uncompromising claims and work on mutual interests and
priorities to find a fair and equitable settlement for all the states involved. China, as the regional
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hegemon and a growing international power, will be key to either a resolution or an escalation of
this current conflict.
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APPENDIX A – DIAGRAMS AND MAPS
Appendix A.0 – UNCLOS Legal Zones234
This diagram shows the legal maritime zones as established by the major provisions of
the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

234

"A Constitution for the Seas," chart, in Living with the Oceans. A Report on the State of the
World’s Oceans, vol. 1 (World Ocean Review, 2010), accessed April 04, 2014,
http://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-1/law-of-the-sea/a-constitution-for-the-seas/.

52

Appendix A.1 – South China Sea235
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A.2.1 - Occupied Spratly Territory.236
This map shows the occupied features in the Spratly archipelago with the conflicting
boundary claims of the six countries claiming sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea.
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A.2.2 – Occupied Spratly Territory within Conflicting Claims237
This map shows the Spratly occupied features within the conflicting boundary claims.
Brunei is not included as it does not have any occupied Spratly feature.
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A.3.1 – Main Shipping Lanes passing through the Spratlys238
This map shows the major shipping lanes that flow through the Spratly area waters. Half
of the world’s merchant fleet and one third of its crude oil pass through the Spratly waters yearly.
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A.3.2 – Main Shipping Lanes around the Spratlys239
This map shows major shipping lanes from around the world that flow through the South
China Sea and the Spratly area.
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A.4.1 - 2011 Major Crude Oil Flow in the South China Sea240

A.4.2 – 2011 Major Natural Gas Trade Flow in the South China Sea241
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A.5 – Population Densities in Coastal Areas around South China Sea242
This map shows the population densities around the coastal areas surrounding the
South China Sea and Spratly Archipelago.
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A.6 – Conflicting Claims in South China Sea243
This map shows the combined maritime boundary claims of the six different countries
disputing Spratly sovereignty in the South China Sea. The Spratly archipelago falls in between
conflicting jurisdictional claims.
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A.7 – Chinese Maritime Boundary Claims in the South China Sea244
The People’s Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) have the
same maritime boundary claims over the Spratly Archipelago.
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A.8 - China’s 9 Dash Line245
This map was submitted by the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to
the United Nations in 2009 to indicate the extent of the territory, which includes the whole
Spratly Archipelago (“Nansha”) that it claims in the South China Sea.
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A.9 – Vietnam’s Maritime Boundary Claims in the South China Sea246

A.10 – The Philippines’ Maritime Boundary Claims in the South China Sea247
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A.11 – Malaysia’s Maritime Boundary Claims in the South China Sea248

A.12 Brunei’s Maritime Boundary Claims in the South China Sea249
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B.1– UN Charter
Purpose and Principles
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in
accordance with the following Principles.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and. justice, are not endangered.
Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first of a, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their
dispute by such means.
The International Court of Justice
Article 92
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It
shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.
Article 93
1. All Members of the United Nations are facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
2. A state which is not of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice on to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon
the recommendation of the Security Council.
Article 94

250

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, accessed February 10, 2014,
https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.

65

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if
it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give to the
judgment.
Article 95
Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the
solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or
which may be concluded in the future
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B.2 – Statutes of the International Court of Justice251
Article 36
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the
part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run
and in accordance with their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the
decision of the Court.
Article 38
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
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B.3 – 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes252
CHAPTER I. On the System of Arbitration
Article 15
International arbitration has for its object the settlement of differences between States by judges of their
own choice, and on the basis of respect for law.
Article 16
In questions of a legal nature, and especially in the interpretation or application of International
Conventions, arbitration is recognized by the Signatory Powers as the most effective, and at the same time
the most equitable, means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle.
Article 17
The Arbitration Convention is concluded for questions already existing or for questions which may arise
eventually.
It may embrace any dispute or only disputes of a certain category.
Article 18
The Arbitration Convention implies the engagement to submit loyally to the Award.
Article 19
Independently of general or private Treaties expressly stipulating recourse to arbitration as obligatory on
the Signatory Powers, these Powers reserve to themselves the right of concluding, either before the
ratification of the present Act or later, new Agreements, general or private, with a view to extending
obligatory arbitration to all cases which they may consider it possible to submit to it.
CHAPTER II. On the Permanent Court of Arbitration
Article 20
With the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences, which it
has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, the Signatory Powers undertake to organize a permanent
Court of Arbitration, accessible at all times and operating, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure inserted in the present Convention.
Article 21
The Permanent Court shall be competent for all arbitration cases, unless the parties agree to institute a
special Tribunal.
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B.4 - 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes253
Chapter I. The System of Arbitration
Article 37
International arbitration has for its object the settlement of disputes between States by Judges of
their own choice and on the basis of respect for law.
Recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to submit in good faith to the Award.
Chapter II. The Permanent Court of Arbitration
Article 41
With the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences,
which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, the Contracting Powers undertake to
maintain the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as established by the First Peace Conference,
accessible at all times, and operating, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, in accordance
with the rules of procedure inserted in the present Convention.
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B.5- United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea254
Territorial Sea
Article2
Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space
over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in
the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as
the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other
rules of international law.
Article3
Breadth of the territorial sea
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding
12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.
Contiguous Zone
Article33
Contiguous zone
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State
may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
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2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

Archipelagic States
Article 46
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands;
(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated
that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical,
economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.
Article49
Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space
over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of
their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed
and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
3. This sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part.
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the
archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.
Exclusive Economic Zones
Article55
Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone
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The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the
specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the
coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions
of this Convention.
Article56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or nonliving, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the
water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this
Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and
shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in
accordance with Part VI.
Article57
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Article58
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Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to
the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation
and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of
ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of
this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive
economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Part.
Article59
Basis for the resolution of conflicts
regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction
in the exclusive economic zone
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to
other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the
coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of
the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
Continental Shelf
Article76
Definition of the continental shelf
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory
to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
Article77
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Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not
explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these
activities without the express consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation,
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-living
resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary
species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under
the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the
subsoil.
Article78
Legal status of the superjacent waters and air space
and the rights and freedoms of other States
1. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the
superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters.
2. The exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf must not infringe or
result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other
States as provided for in this Convention.
Regime of Islands
Article121
Regime of islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
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Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas
Article122
Definition
For the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means a gulf, basin or sea
surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet
or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or
more coastal States.
Article123
Cooperation of States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the
exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end
they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization:
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of
the living resources of the sea;
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the
protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate
joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations
to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.
Settlement of Disputes
Article 279
Obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means
States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application
of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter
of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by the means indicated in Article 33,
paragraph 1, of the Charter.
Article 280
Settlement of disputes by any peaceful means chosen by the parties
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Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute
between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful
means of their own choice.
Article 281
Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the parties
1. If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their
own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been
reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any
further procedure.
2. If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only upon the expiration of
that time-limit.
Article 282
Obligations under general, regional or bilateral agreements
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that
such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that
entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this
Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.
Article 286
Application of procedures under this section
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention
shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request
of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.
Article 287
Choice of procedure
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State shall
be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the
settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in
accordance with Annex VI;
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(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII
for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
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APPENDIX C – TREATIES

C.1 - Treaty of Peace with Japan (excerpt)255
Signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951
Initial entry into force: 28 April 1952

TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN
WHEREAS the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those
of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common
welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of
concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the
existence of a state of war between them;
WHEREAS Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations
and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to
strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create
within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in
public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;
WHEREAS the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;
THE ALLIED POWERS AND JAPAN have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of
Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation
of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:
CHAPTER II
TERRITORY
Article 2
(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea,
including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
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(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of
Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence
of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.
(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate
System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, extending
the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.
(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the
Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.
(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.
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C.2 - 1952 Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan (excerpt)256

Signed at Taipei, 28 April 1952
Entered into force, 5 August 1952, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Taipei

TREATY OF PEACE
The Republic of China and Japan,
Considering their mutual desire for good neighbourliness in view of their historical and
cultural ties and geographical proximity; Realising the importance of their close cooperation to
the promotion of their common welfare and to the maintenance of international peace and
security; Recognising the need for a settlement of problems that have arisen as a result of the
existence of a state of war between them; Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and have
accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: Mr. YEH KUNG-CHAO;
The Government of Japan: Mr. ISAO KAWADA
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form,
have agreed upon the following Articles:—
Article 2
It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of
San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan
has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as
well as the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands.
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C.3 - 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea257
The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of
China,
REAFFIRMING their determination to consolidate and develop the friendship and cooperation existing
between their people and governments with the view to promoting a 21st century-oriented partnership of
good neighbourliness and mutual trust;
COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South
China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and
prosperity in the region;
COMMITTED to enhancing the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of
the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and President of the People's Republic
of China;
DESIRING to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and
disputes among countries concerned;
HEREBY DECLARE the following:
1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized
principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;
2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with
the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect;
3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and
overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations
by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate
or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of
inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle
their differences in a constructive manner.
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Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned
undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build
trust and confidence between and among them, including:
a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military
officials;
b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;
c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined
military exercise; and
d. exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.
6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may
explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the following:
a. marine environmental protection;
b. marine scientific research;
c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;
d. search and rescue operation; and
e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy
and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.
The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should
be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior to their actual implementation.
7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues concerning
relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including regular consultations on the
observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency,
establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of
disputes among them;
8. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take actions consistent
therewith;
9. The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in this Declaration;
10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea
would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus,
towards the eventual attainment of this objective.
Done on the Fourth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Two in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom
of Cambodia.
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C.4 – 1982 Timor Gap Treaty (excerpt)258
1989 TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON THE
ZONE OF COOPERATION IN AN AREA BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN PROVINCE OF
EAST TIMOR AND NORTHERN AUSTRALIA
Adopted in Timor Sea (Zone of Cooperation) on 11 December 1989
AUSTRALIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea done at
Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 and, in particular, Article 83 which requires States with
opposite coasts, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, to make every effort to enter into
provisional arrangements of a practical nature which do not jeopardize or hamper the reaching
of final agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf;
DESIRING to enable the exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum resources of the
continental shelf of the area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and northern
Australia yet to be the subject of permanent continental shelf delimitation between the
Contracting States;
CONSCIOUS of the need to encourage and promote development of the petroleum resources
of the area;
DESIRING that exploration for and exploitation of these resources proceed without delay;
AFFIRMING existing agreements on the delimitation of the continental shelf between their two
countries;
DETERMINED to cooperate further for the mutual benefit of their peoples in the development of
the resources of the area of the continental shelf yet to be the subject of permanent continental
shelf delimitation between their two countries;
FULLY COMMITTED to maintaining, renewing and further strengthening the mutual respect,
friendship and cooperation between their two countries through existing agreements and
arrangements, as well as their policies of promoting constructive neighbourly cooperation;
MINDFUL of the interests which their countries share as immediate neighbours, and in a spirit
of cooperation, friendship and goodwill;
CONVINCED that this Treaty will contribute to the strengthening of the relations between their
two countries; and
BELIEVING that the establishment of joint arrangements to permit the exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum resources in the area will further augment the range of contact and
cooperation between the Governments of the two countries and benefit the development of
contacts between their peoples;
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C.5 – 1959 Antarctic Treaty259

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
Signed at Washington December 1, 1959
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 10, 1960
Ratified by U.S. President August 18, 1960
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington August 18, 1960
Proclaimed by U.S. President June 23, 1961
Entered into force June 23, 1961
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord;
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international
cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica;
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development of such
cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the
International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind;
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance
of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures
of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of
military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or
for any other peaceful purposes.
Article II
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the
International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present treaty.
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Article III
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in
Article II of the present treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and
practicable:
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit
maximum economy and efficiency of operations;
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations;
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely
available.
2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to the establishment of cooperative
working relations with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other international
organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.
Article IV
1. Nothing contained in the present treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its
nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition
of any other States right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for
asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of
sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present treaty is in force.
Article V
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shallbe
prohibited.
2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy,
including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under
Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica.
Article VI
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The provisions of the present treaty shall apply to the area south of 60o South Latitude, including all ice
shelves, but nothing in the present treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, orthe exercise of
the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area.
Article VII
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present treaty,
each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in
Article IX of the treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for
by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The
names of observers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate
observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment.
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall have
complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all
ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open
at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any ofthe
Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers.
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present treaty enters into force for it, inform the
other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all
expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory;
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to
the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present treaty.
Article VIII
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present treaty, and without prejudice to the
respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica,
observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under
subparagraph 1(b) of Article III of the treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons,
shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of
all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.
Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures
in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute
with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to
reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
Article IX
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1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present treaty shall meet at the
City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the treaty, and thereafter at
suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information,consulting together on matters of
common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their
Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty, including measures
regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of the treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present treaty by accession under Article XIII
shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the
present Article, during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by
conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or
the despatch of a scientific expedition.
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present treaty shall be transmitted to the
representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the
present Article.
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become effective when approved by all the
Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider
those measures.
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present treaty may be exercised from the date of entry into
force of the treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been
proposed, considered or approved as provided in this Article.
Article X
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the present treaty.
Article XI
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of the present treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to
having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation,conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement
or other peaceful means of their own choice.
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2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the
dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement on
reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of
continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article.
Article XII
1. (a) The present treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of the
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under
Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when the depositary Government
has received notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.
(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting Party
when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary Government. Any such Contracting
Party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of two years from the date of entry
into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of
this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present treaty on the date of the expiration of
such period.
2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present treaty, any of the
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under
Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of all
the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the treaty.
(b) Any modification or amendment to the present treaty which is approved at such a Conference by a
majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a majority of those whose representatives
are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the
depositary Government to all the Contracting Parties immediately after the termination of the Conference
and shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article.
(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the provisions of
subparagraph 1(a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date of its communication to all the
Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice
to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present treaty; and such withdrawal shall take
effect two years after the receipt of the notice of the depositary Government.
Article XIII
1. The present treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shall be open for accession
by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State which may be invited to
accede to the treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to
participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the treaty.
2. Ratification of or accession to the present treaty shall be effected by each State in accordance with its
constitutional processes.
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the
United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government.
88

4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each deposit of
an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the treaty and of any
modification or amendment thereto.
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, the present treaty shall enter
into force for those States and for States which have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the
treaty shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its instrument of accession.
6. The present treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article XIV
The present treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each version being
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America,
which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding
States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, have signed the present
treaty.
DONE at Washington this first day of December, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine.
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C.6 – 1979 Torres Straight Treaty (excerpt)260

TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA
NEW GUINEA CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY AND MARITIME BOUNDARIES IN
THE AREA BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE AREA KNOWN
AS TORRES STRAIT, AND RELATED MATTERS
AUSTRALIA AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA,
DESIRING to set down their agreed position as to their respective sovereignty over certain
islands, to establish maritime boundaries and to provide for certain other related matters, in the
area between the two countries including the area known as Torres Strait;
RECOGNISING the importance of protecting the traditional way of life and livelihood of
Australians who are Torres Strait Islanders and of Papua New Guineans who live in the coastal
area of Papua New Guinea in and adjacent to the Torres Strait;
RECOGNISING ALSO the importance of protecting the marine environment and ensuring
freedom of navigation and overflight for each other's vessels and aircraft in the Torres Strait
area;
DESIRING ALSO to cooperate with one another in that area in the conservation, management
and sharing of fisheries resources and in regulating the exploration and exploitation of seabed
mineral resources;
AS good neighbours and in a spirit of cooperation, friendship and goodwill;
HAVE AGREED as follows:
PART 1
DEFINITIONS
Article 1
Definitions
1. In this Treaty-

260

Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning
Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two Countries, including the Area Known
as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, 18 December 1978 (United Nations), accessed April 04, 2014,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/AUSPNG1978TS.PDF.
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(a) "adjacent coastal area" means, in relation to Papua New Guinea, the coastal area of the Papua
New Guinea mainland, and the Papua New Guinea islands, near the Protected Zone; and, in
relation to Australia, the coastal area of the Australian mainland, and the Australian islands, near
the Protected Zone;
(b) "fisheries jurisdiction" means sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing fisheries resources other than sedentary species;
(c) "fisheries resources" means all living natural resources of the sea and seabed, including all
swimming and sedentary species;
(d) "free movement" means movement by the traditional inhabitants for or in the course of
traditional activities;
(e) "indigenous fauna and flora" includes migratory fauna;
(f) "mile" means an international nautical mile being 1,852 metres in length;
(g) "Protected Zone" means the zone established under Article 10;
(h) "Protected Zone commercial fisheries" means the fisheries resources of present or potential
commercial significance within the Protected Zone and, where a stock of such resources belongs
substantially to the Protected Zone but extends into an area outside but near it, the part of that
stock found in that area within such limits as are agreed from time to time by the responsible
authorities of the Parties;
(i) "seabed jurisdiction" means sovereign rights over the continental shelf in accordance with
international law, and includes jurisdiction over low-tide elevations, and the right to exercise
such jurisdiction in respect of those elevations, in accordance with international law;
(j) "sedentary species" means living organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with
the seabed or the subsoil;
(k) "traditional activities" means activities performed by the traditional inhabitants in accordance
with local tradition, and includes, when so performed(i) activities on land, including gardening, collection of food and hunting;
(ii) activities on water, including traditional fishing;
(iii) religious and secular ceremonies or gatherings for social purposes, for example, marriage
celebrations and settlement of disputes; and
(iv) barter and market trade.
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In the application of this definition, except in relation to activities of a commercial nature,
"traditional" shall be interpreted liberally and in the light of prevailing custom;
(l) "traditional fishing" means the taking, by traditional inhabitants for their own or their
dependants' consumption or for use in the course of other traditional activities, of the living
natural resources of the sea, seabed, estuaries and coastal tidal areas, including dugong and
turtle;
(m) "traditional inhabitants" means, in relation to Australia, persons who(i) are Torres Strait Islanders who live in the Protected Zone or the adjacent coastal area of
Australia,
(ii) are citizens of Australia, and
(iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas or features in or in the vicinity of the
Protected Zone in relation to their subsistence or livelihood or social, cultural or religious
activities; and
in relation to Papua New Guinea, persons who(i) live in the Protected Zone or the adjacent coastal area of Papua New Guinea,
(ii) are citizens of Papua New Guinea, and
(iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas or features in or in the vicinity of the
Protected Zone in relation to their subsistence or livelihood or social, cultural or religious
activities.
2. Where for the purposes of this Treaty it is necessary to determine the position on the surface
of the Earth of a point, line or area, that position shall be determined by reference to the
Australian Geodetic Datum, that is to say, by reference to a spheroid having its centre at the
centre of the Earth and a major (equatorial) radius of 6,378,160 metres and a flattening of
100/[divided by]29825 and by reference to the position of the Johnston Geodetic Station in the
Northern Territory of Australia. That station shall be taken to be situated at Latitude
25o56'54.5515" South and at Longitude 133o12'30.0771" East and to have a ground level of
571.2 metres above the spheroid referred to above.
3. In this Treaty, the expression "in and in the vicinity of the Protected Zone" describes an area
the outer limits of which might vary according to the context in which the expression is used.
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